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Abstract
In an attempt to strike a balance between the rights of an individual
shareholder in his efforts to protect the corporation, and the rights
of the board of directors to control the litigation in which the corporation
is involved, the Supreme Court of Delaware, in Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado,” developed a new set of game plans for shareholder derivative
suits.
KEYWORDS: water, business, judgement
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado: "Steering a Middle
Course" May Spell Deep Water for Business
Judgment Application in Shareholder Derivative Suits
In an attempt to strike a balance between the rights of an individ-
ual shareholder in his efforts to protect the corporation, and the rights
of the board of directors to control the litigation in which the corpora-
tion is involved, the Supreme Court of Delaware, in Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado," developed a new set of game plans for shareholder deriva-
tive suits. While Zapata is important because of its impact on procedu-
ral elements of shareholder derivative actions,2 what makes it so note-
worthy is the impact it may have on future applications of the business
judgment rules in such actions.
This comment will focus on the three cases that set the framework
for the Zapata decision. They are: Maldonado v. Flynn4 [Maldonado
I], Maldonado v. Flynn5 [Maldonado I], and Maher v. Zapata Cor-
poration.' All three cases arose from similar transactions by the
Zapata board of directors, and in each the court faced a common issue:
whether the board of directors could compel dismissal of a share-
holder's derivative suit after an independent committee, appointed by
the board, determined that the suit was not in the best interest of
Zapata Corporation. In analyzing the courts' decisions, this comment
will survey general principles governing shareholder derivative actions,
and consider the business judgment rule as it pertains to such actions.
The Trilogy - A Review of the Related Cases
In 1970, the board of directors of Zapata Corporation, a Delaware
1. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
2. For a discussion of procedures, see text at 6 infra.
3. For a discussion of "business judgment" rule, see text at 10 infra.
4. 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980).
5. 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
6. 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
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firm, approved a stock option plan for certain officers and directors of
the corporation. The options were to be exercised during five install-
ment periods from 1971 to 1974. Under the plan eligible officers and
directors could exercise their options to purchase Zapata's common
stock at $12.15 per share. Zapata Corporation stockholders approved
the stock option plan in 197 1.7
In 1974, the board of directors voted to accelerate the last option
date from July 14, 1974, to July 2, 1974.8 At that time most of
Zapata's directors were eligible to participate in the 1970 stock option
plan.9 By accelerating the date, the option holders expected to reduce
their anticipated tax liability.10 Therefore, on July 2, eligible partici-
pants exercised their final option."1
William Maldonado, a Zapata stockholder, initiated a share-
holder's derivative suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery in June of
1975.12 He alleged ten corporate officers and directors breached their
fiduciary duty by accelerating the option date. This "deprived Zapata
of a federal tax deduction in an amount equal to that saved by the
optionees. This occurred because the options were exercised [early],
when the price of Zapata stock was $18.8125, rather than on July 14,
1974, when the price of Zapata stock was [approximately] $24.50." 13
In 1977, Maldonado brought a second shareholder's derivative suit
in the United States District Court for the Sourthern District of New
York,14 against nine of Zapata's past and current directors for alleged
7. 413 A.2d at 1254.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Vice Chancelor Hartnett in his opinion explained:
This was so because the amount of capital gain for federal income tax
purposes to the optionees would have been an amount equal to the differ-
ence between the $12.15 option price and the price on the date of the
exercise of the option: $18-19 if the options were exercised prior to the
tender offer announcement or nearly $25 if the options were exercised im-
mediately after the announcement.
Id. at 1254.
11. Id.
12. Maldonado I, 413 A.2d 1251.
13. Id. at 1255.
14. Maldonado v. Flynn, 448 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
1 192 Nova Law Journal 6:19811
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violations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.15 Finding Mal-
donado had failed to state a cause of action, the district court dismissed
his complaint but granted him leave to amend.16 Maldonado appealed
the decision, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
manded the case.'7 He then filed an amended complaint in the district
court.' 8 A third shareholder's derivative suit was filed against Zapata
by John F. Maher and other stockholders in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas, 19 also alleging violations of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 193420 by several Zapata board
members.
Four of the defendant directors had left Zapata's board by June of
1979.1 To fill those vacancies, the remaining directors appointed two
new directors from outside the corporation.22 After the appointment,
the board created an Independent Investigation Committee2 3 "author-
ized to investigate the claims asserted in [the three suits] and to take
any course of action it deemed appropriate in view of its findings. 24
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1034. Maldonado's initial filing alleged
that defendants (1) violated § 10(b) of the Act [Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934], 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and Rule lOb-5 by modifying the stock
option plan without obtaining stockholders' approval, resulting in certain
directors using inside information to gain substantial personal benefits at
the Corporation's expense, and (2) violated § 14(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(a) and Rule 14a-9 thereunder by making statements in proxy solici-
tations issued to the shareholders by the Corporation in 1975, 1976, and
1977, for the election of directors of the Corporation that were materially
misleading with respect to the earlier modification of the stock option
planned and the directors' exercise of their options thereunder.
Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979).
17. Id.
18. Maldonado II, 485 F. Supp. at 277. "The amended complaint [sought] to
nullify the elections of directors from 1975-1979; an injunction against further mislead-
ing proxy statements; and to recover from the defendants on behalf of Zapata damages
allegedly flowing from the issuance of the claimed deceptive proxy materials." Id.
19. , 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
20. Id. at 349.
21. 430 A.2d at 781.
22. Id. at 781.
23. 413 A.2d at 1255.
24. Id.
3
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This committee was composed exclusively of the two new directors.25
After conducting its investigation "the Committee concluded, in
September, 1979, that each action should have [been] dismissed forth-
with as their continued maintenance [was] inimical to the Company's
best interest .... -26Accordingly, the Committee "instructed Counsel
for Zapata to seek dismissal of all the pending suits."' 27 The following
January, on remand, the District Court for the Southern District of
New York granted Zapata's motion for summary judgment dismissing
the Maldonado II action.28 The basis for the decision, district court
Judge Edward Weinfeld stated, was "that the Committee, composed of
independent and disinterested directors, conducted a proper review of
the matters before it, considered a variety of factors and reached, in
good faith, a business judgment that the action was not in the best
interest of Zapata. 29 Maldonado appealed to the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals.30
Zapata's attorneys were not as successful in opposing Maldonado's
state action, Maldonado L The Delaware Court of Chancery ruled that
"nothing in [the business judgment rule] grants any independent power
to a corporation board of directors to terminate a derivative suit."3 As
a result, the Court of Chancery denied Zapata's motion to dismiss the
suit. 2 Zapata filed an interlocutory appeal with the Supreme Court of
Delaware which was accepted for review in Zapata Corporation v.
Maldonado.33 Before the appeal was accepted, however, the chancery
court applied the holding of the New York federal district court in
Maldonado II and dismissed Maldonado I on res judicata principles.3
The Maldonado I dismissal was contingent upon the Second Circuit's
affirmance of the district court's decision in Maldonado 11.35 The Dela-
25. Id.
26. 430 A.2d at 781.
27. 413 A.2d at 1255.
28. 485 F. Supp. 274.
29. Id. at 286-87.
30. 430 A.2d 779.
31. 413 A.2d at 1257.
32. Id.
33. 430 A.2d 779.
34. Maldonado v. Flynn, 417 A.2d 378, 384-85 (Del. Ch. 1980).
35. Id.
4
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ware Supreme Court in Zapata stated, "the Second Circuit Appeal
was ordered stayed . . . pending this Court's resolution of the appeal
from April 19th Court of Chancery order denying dismissal and sum-
mary judgment."3 6
In Maher, Zapata filed a motion to dismiss which the Texas fed-
eral district court denied in a decision similar to that in Maldonado L37
The federal district court in Maher held that the business judgment
rule did not grant a committee authority to compel dismissal of a
shareholder derivative suit in situations in which no demand is made on
the board of directors to initiate an action.3 8
Courts in various jurisdictions have distinguished those situations
where the shareholder is required to demand that the corporate board
file suit, from those situations when the shareholder is excused from
making such a demand prior to initiating a derivative suit. The distinc-
tions between "demand" and "no demand" conditions significantly im-
pact on the procedures and guidelines which are employed in a suit.39
In the Zapata trilogy none of the plaintiffs demanded the board of di-
rectors to file suit against any of the defendants, prior to initiating his
individual action. The board's own interest in the subject matter of the
litigation would have made demand futile.
The central issue interwoven among each of the three cases was
whether the independent committee had the power to compel dismissal
of the shareholder derivative actions, especially when many of the di-
rectors who appointed the committee were named defendants. Each
court had to deal with questions about the interpretation and applica-
tion of the business judgment rule; this led to divergent results in Mal-
donado I and II.
Because of these variations in interpretation and application of
Delaware corporate law, the proper framework (and no doubt, ur-
gency) for resolution of the issues existed. The Supreme Court of Dela-
ware acknowledged and resolved them in Zapata:40 it set new guide-
lines for Delaware courts to use in ruling on a corporation's motion to
36. 430 A.2d at 781.
37. 490 F. Supp. at 352-53.
38. Id. at 348.
39. The distinctions between demand and no demand are discussed in text at
198-200, infra.
40. 430 A.2d at 781.
5
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dismiss a derivative suit where demand has been excused. However,
because of the resulting impact the Zapata decision may have on appli-
cation of the business judgment rule in shareholder derivative suits, the
holding in Zapata most probably was not what some knowledgeable
commentators had anticipated."1
Shareholder Derivative Actions
A corporation is a unique entity providing investors an opportunity
to share in business ownership and profits, while minimizing an inves-
tor's financial exposure and involvement in the day to day management
of the firm.' 2 Management functions traditionally are delegated to the
directors of the corporation after their election to the board by the
stockholders. This separation between ownership and management is
not without pitfalls. The stockholder, "having surrendered individual
control over his investment for the opportunity of corporate profit,...
entrusts his fortunes to a board of directors who may well invest poorly,
or worse, engage in self dealing."' 3
The problems created by this separation between ownership and
management become more apparent when a minority stockholder has
serious and well-founded concerns with the quality and/or integrity of
the board's management decisions. A director or an officer of a corpo-
ration has a fiduciary duty to that business." A breach of that duty
gives rise to a cause of action by the corporation against that director
or officer.' 5 Similarly, the corporation may have claims against third
persons for wrongs unrelated to corporate management. 48 Whether in-
ternally or externally created, the result of the injury is damage to the
value of the corporation and, correspondingly, diminution in value'of
41. See discussion on commentators in text at 206, infra.
42. For a discussion of the attributes of the corporation entity as compared with
other business structures, see H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
ch. 2 (West 2d ed. 1970).
43. Stegemoeller, Derivative Actions and the Business Judgment Rule:
Directoral Power to Compel Dismissal, 69 ILL. B.J. 338 (1981).
44. Steinberg, The Use of Special Litigation Committees to Terminate Share-
holder Derivative Suits, 35 U. OF MIAMI L. REv. 1, 3 (1980); HENN, supra note 42, at
457-58.
45. HENN, supra note 42, at 95.
46. Id. at 740.
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shareholders' interests."' However, since it is the corporation that di-
rectly suffers from the loss, it is the corporation that has a direct cause
of action - not the individual stockholder.4 8 Generally, the individual
stockholder lacks sufficient voting strength to directly influence board
decisions to file suit or compel the ouster of an errant director. Lacking
the ability to force the corporation to sue in its own behalf, the stock-
holder may be doomed to watch his investment dwindle, or perhaps
gush, away.
When the corporation has a valid claim iwhich it refuses to litigate,
the individual stockholder theoretically has no legal remedy. 9 In the
past, the stockholder was considered to be without standing to initiate a
suit on behalf of the corporation. Seeing the minority shareholder in
this dilemma, equity courts developed the shareholder's derivative ac-
tion.51 They found this right to bring the suit derived from ownership of
an equitable or beneficial interest in the corporation and the corpora-
tion's failure to initiate a suit on its own behalf.5 2 "In legal effect a
stockholder's [derivative] suit is one by the corporation conducted by
the stockholder as its representative. The stockholder is only a nominal
plaintiff, the corporation being the real party in interest. '53 In essence,
the shareholder is a catalyst for the corporation to take action against
one of its own officers or a third party, if either is endangering the
corporation and its board of directors has not taken action.
The threshold question to be determined in most shareholder de-
rivative actions is whether the right to sue on behalf of the corporation
has vested in the shareholder. As a rule, state statutes regulate share-
holder derivative suits." Typically, these statutes require the stock-
holder, inter alia, to have "contemporaneous ownership of shares in or-
der to maintain the suit ... " and that the plaintiff "allege his efforts
47. 13 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 5941.1 (Callaghan Rev. per. ed. 1980).
48. Id. § 5944.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. § 5940.
52. Id. § 5941.
53. Id. § 5939. The corporation "enters the litigation as a nominal party defen-
dant because of its failure to enforce the claim in its own rights." HENN, supra note 42,
at 777.
54. FLETCHER, supra note 47.
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to obtain relief within the corporation before bringing his suit."55
Delaware's Chancery Court Rules are in harmony with these re-
quirements. 56 The courts in Delaware have construed the chancery
court rules as creating two different types of shareholder derivative ac-
tions: those where a demand to initiate suit must be made on the corpo-
rate board, 57 and those where the demand requirement is excused.58
Generally a demand is considered to be a condition precedent to a
shareholder's right to initiate a derivative suit.59 The purpose of the
demand is to give "the management of the corporation an opportunity
to consider the merits of the dispute and to determine in the interests of
the corporation and the shareholders whether it might be disposed of
without the expense and delay of litigation." 60
There are a number of perfectly legitimate reasons why a board of
directors, or an independent investigaton committee acting in its stead,
may find it undesirable to litigate corporate claims. The probability of
success in trial, a cost-benefit analysis of the suit, and the effect on a
company's image and its employees' morale are factors bearing on a
decision to litigate.61
There may be instances when, after proper demand, the board
agrees to litigate.62 This decision would obviate the need for a share-
55. Id.
56. DEL. CODE ANN. Chancery Court Rules § 23.1 (1980). This rule provides:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to
enforce a right of a corporation or of an incorporated association, the cor-
poration or association having failed to enforce a right which may properly
be asserted by it, the complaint shall allege that the plaintiff was a share-
holder or member at the time of the transaction of which he complaing or
that his share or membership thereafter devolved on him by operation of
law. The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any,
made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors or
comparable authority and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or
for not making the effort.
57. See generally 413 A.2d 1262.
58. See generally 430 A.2d 779.
59. FLETCHER, supra note 47, § 4961.
60. Id. § 4963.
61. Steinberg, supra note 44, at 2. See also Note, Corporations - The Share-
holder's Independent Right to Sue Derivatively - Maldonado v. Flynn and Its Progeny,
29 U. OF KAN. L. REV. 135 (1980).
62. See HENN supra note 42, § 361.
8
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holder's derivative suit because the corporation would be pursuing the
action under its own appellation."3 There are also situations in which a
demand has been made properly, and the board refuses to file suit;
however, rather than resisting the individual's efforts to initiate a deriv-
ative action, the board gives some type of assistance to the stock-
holder.64 In Sohland v. Baker,65 a Delaware case, a board refused to
file suit, but it financially assisted the stockholder in retaining counsel
in order that he could initiate a derivative suit.66 Assuming the board's
refusal to initiate suit rests on an "independen[t], good faith and rea-
sonable investigation"67 of the shareholder's allegations, the share-
holder's right to initiate the derivative action terminates. The share-
holder may still be able to initiate the suit if he meets the burden of
showing that these good faith elements are lacking.6 8 This is a difficult
burden to meet since the court will presume the existence of good faith
on the part of the board of directors.6 9 The board of director's decisions
in demand situations are protected under the business judgment rule. 0
Generally, a shareholder is excused from making a demand if it
would be futile;71 however, "the complainant normally must demon-
strate that the directors are either controlled by the alleged wrongdoer,
interested in the challenged transaction to a degree which impairs their
business judgment, or are participants in the alleged wrong."7 2 This
was the type of situation encountered in each of the Zapata cases: the
named defendants/directors constituted a majority of the corporate
board.
Recently, the common practice of corporate boards has been to
appoint an independent committee to investigate the need or desire for
initiating litigation after demand has been made.73 Similarly, in those
63. Id. at 750.
64. See id. § 361.
65. 141 A. 277 (Del. 1927).
66. See 430 A.2d at 783 discussing Sohland.
67. Id. at 787.
68. Id. at 784.
69. Id.
70. For discussion, see text at 200 infra.
71. See generally Steinberg, supra note 44.
72. Stegemoeller, supra note 43, at 342.
73. Steinberg, supra note 44.
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cases where demand is excused, and a derivative suit has been filed, the
board appoints a committee to determine whether the suit is in the best
interest of the corporation.74 Typically, the committee finds the suit is
not in the corporation's best interest, and, accordingly, seeks to have
the suit dismissed.75 This was the committee's recommendation in the
Zapata case.
Courts are faced with a dilemma in these no demand situations
when the corporation seeks to have the suit dismissed. If the board de-
termines that the suit is not in the best interest of the corporation,
should a minority shareholder override that determination and be able
to maintain the suit on the corporation's behalf?78 There is a presump-
tion that the board of directors and the independent committee have
acted in good faith on behalf of the corporation. Therefore, courts have
been reluctant to overrule decisions of the board of directors based on
their business judgment unless the board or the committee fails to meet
the good faith criteria." The courts in both Maldonado I and Maher
determined that the board did not have the authority to terminate de-
mand excused derivative suits under the business judgment rule. 8
It is appropriate, in this context, to examine the business judgment
rule.
The Business Judgment Rule79
"It is well settled that the management of a corporation is en-
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 430 A.2d at 785.
77. Id. at 784.
78. 413 A.2d at 1257. 490 F. Supp. at 348.
79. The "business judgment" rule has been restated by.one author as:
A corporation transaction that involves no self-dealings by, or other per-
sonal interest of, the directors who authorized the transaction will not be
enjoined or set aside for the directors' failure to satisfy the standards that
govern a director's performance of his or her duties, and directors who
authorized the transaction will not be held personally liable for resultant
damages, unless:
(1) the directors did not exercise due care to ascertain the relevant
and available facts before voting to authorize the transaction; or
(2) the directors voted to authorize the transaction even though they
Nova Law Journal
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trusted to its board of directors, and that business judgments made by
the board are not subject to review unless they are made in bad
faith."80 This concept has evolved into the business judgment rule
which has provided legal practitioners and scholars fertile ground for
debating whether the rule provides a corporation's board of directors
with only a shield or with a sword as well."' If the business judgment
rule is only protective, it merely shields the board from liability arising
out of inefficient, albeit, good faith decisions. However, if the board has
the authority to initiate legal actions based on its business judgment,
the rule becomes a sword as well.
The business judgment rule presumes that a board of directors, in
good faith, considers the best interests of the corporation when reach-
ing management decisions.8 2 As the court in Zapata noted, the business
judgment rule was a judicial creation in Delaware "to give recognition
and deference to directors' business expertise when exercising their
managerial power under § 141(a)" of the Delaware Code.83
did not reasonably believe or could not have reasonably believed the trans-
action to be for the best interest of the corporation; or
(3) in some other way the directors' authorization of the transaction
was not in good faith.
Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 111 (1979).
80. 490 F. Supp. at 351.
81. Arsht, supra note 79; Steinberg, supra note 44; Comment, Novel Application
of the Business Judgment Rule: Independent Directors Are Permitted to Terminate
Derivative Actions Against Fellow Interested Directors, 11 CuM. L. REV. 389 (1980);
Legal Times of Washington, Jan. 19, 1981, at 33 (Analysis & Perspective); Johnson &
Osborne, The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in a Litigious Society, 15 VAL. L.
REV. 49 (1980); Note, supra note 61. See also Abbey v. Control Corp., 603 F.2d 724
(8th Cir. 1979); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 76 (1968);
Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
82. HENN, supra note 42, at 483.
83. 430 A.2d at 782. The court noted the applicable text of DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 141(a) (1980) to be:
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this
chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors,
except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation. If any such provision is made in the certificate of incorpora-
tion, the powers and duties conferred or imposed upon the board of direc-
tors by this chapter shall be exercised or performed to such extent and by
such person or persons as shall be provided in the certificate of
incorporation.
11
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It follows that if the board of directors has the power to manage
the corporation84 and the authority to appoint an independent commit-
tee to act in its behalf,85 then when the committee makes its good faith
business decision regarding suit on behalf of the corporation, its deci-
sion as a business judgment should be honored by the courts.8"
Thus, the shield versus sword debate becomes particularly signifi-
cant in the context of shareholder derivative actions. In those instances
where demand is required prior to commencing the derivative suit,
courts have been reluctant to challenge board refusal to sue on the cor-
poration's behalf.8 7 As noted earlier, the shareholder's right to sue de-
rivatively terminates once demand has been made and properly re-
fused. 8 Here the board's decision is conspicuously sheltered by the
business judgment rule."
However, in those situations where demand is excused, a question
arises as to whether the board can compel dismissal of the derivative
suit. Initially, the court in Maldonado II said yes, and held "that the
Committee had the authority under the 'business judgment' rule, to re-
quire the termination of the derivative action." 90
The court in Zapata however, rejecting the logic of Maldonado II,
held the rule should not impede derivative actions where demand on
the board was excused.91
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado: The Balance Tips for the
Shareholder
The court in Zapata addressed a novel issue: whether an indepen-
dent committee, appointed by the board of directors, had the power to
compel dismissal of a shareholder derivative suit when no demand had
been made on the board to initiate an action.92 To answer this question,
Id.
84. 430 A.2d 786.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 779.
87. Id. at 784.
88. See text at 199, supra.
89. The rule applies to directors and officers alike. Arsht, supra note 81, at 111.
90. 430 A.2d at 781.
91. See generally 430 A.2d 779 and discussion in 202-07 infra.
92. In the major case of Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979), the Supreme
12
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the court examined, separately, three inherent components:
The continuing right of a stockholder to maintain a derivative suit;
the corporate power under Delaware law of an authorized board
committee to cause dismissal of litigation instituted for the benefit
of the corporation; and the role of the Court of Chancery [of Dela-
ware] in resolving conflicts between the stockholder and the
committee. 3
Ultimately the court focused "on the power to speak for the corpora-
tion as to whether the lawsuit should be continued or terminated. '94
The court stated that "disputes pertaining to control of the suit
arise in two contexts."' 5 These contexts are: first, where a stockholder
properly demands the board to initiate suit, the board refuses, and the
stockholder claims the board's decision was wrongful; and second,
where the stockholder initiates a derivative suit without first making a
demand because such demand would be futile.98
In determining whether the individual stockholder had an individ-
ual right to maintain the suit, the court firmly distinguished the de-
mand required from the demand excused circumstance evidenced in
Zapata.97
"[W]here demand is properly excused, the stockholder does pos-
sess the ability to initiate the action on his corporation's behalf."98 But,
while acknowledging the shareholder's right to initiate, the court noted
that this right did not necessarily translate into shareholder power to
exclusively control the corporation's "right throughout the litigation. ' 9
Court, in developing a two prong test to be applied to similar questions arising in share-
holder derivative actions, held that state law was determinative as to whether a com-
mittee has the power to compel dismissal of an action. See also Zolezzi, Director Good
Faith Marches On: A California Analysis of Director Termination of Shareholder
Derivative Suits Under Burks v. Lasker, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 519 (1980).
93. 430 A.2d at 782.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 784.
96. Id.
97. The court's discussion regarding "demand required" situations was dicta,
however, it will be very persuasive in future decisions.
98. 430 A.2d at 784.
99. Id. at 785.
13
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The court reasoned "that such an inflexible rule would recognize the
interest of one person or group to the exclusion of all others within the
corporate entity." 00 The court recognized that "[e]ven when demand is
excusable, circumstances may arise when continuation of the litigation
would not be in the corporation's best interests."' 0'1 Therefore, the court
reasoned that if there was not "a permissible procedure under § 141(a)
by which a corporation [could] rid itself of detrimental litigation . . . a
single stockholder in an extreme case might control the destiny of the
entire corporation."' 2
After acknowledging the dangers of allowing a sole stockholder to
control derivative litigation, the court addressed the question of
whether the independent committee had the authority to seek termina-
tion of the suit. The court in Zapata held that the power of the board
to appoint an independent committee to act in its stead is found in the
Delaware statutes.'0 3 Therefore, since the committee received its au-
thority from the board, the committee "would have the power to move
for dismissal or summary judgment if the entire board did."'' 0 4 The
court further noted that although a majority of Zapata's board mem-
bers were tainted by self-interest, this was not "a legal bar to the dele-
gation of board power to an independent committee composed of disin-
terested board members."' 0 5
The court held that in both demand required and demand excused
circumstances, the board retained power "to make decisions regarding
corporate litigation."'0 8O Thus, the committee had the authority to seek
termination of the suit.
While reaffirming the committee's legal power, the Zapata court
nevertheless usurped board power to defeat the derivative suit and ex-
pressly changed the game plans for suits in demand excused situations.
By its promulgation of new guidelines the Delaware Supreme Court
appears to have given minority shareholders a distinct advantage in
such suits.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. See applicable text of statute at note 83, supra.
103. 430 A.2d at 785.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 786.
106. Id.
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As currently outlined by the Zapata court, the requirements for
the corporation's pretrial motion to dismiss include submitting "a thor-
ough written record of the investigation and its findings and recommen-
dations. . . .Under appropriate court supervision, akin to proceedings
on summary judgment, each side should have an opportunity to make a
record on the motion."'107 The moving party, i.e., the corporation, then
will have the burden of showing "that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to dismiss as a
matter of law."' 10 8
The more important advantage Zapata gives shareholders is a
two-step test which Delaware courts will be required to apply to that
motion. In the first step, "the court should inquire into the indepen-
dence and good faith of the committee and the bases supporting [the
committee's] conclusions."' 10 9 The independence and good faith ele-
ments are totally consistent with prior criteria established for reviewing
the propriety of a corporation's decisions. However, requiring the court
to review the bases of the committee's decision creates a new dimension
of inquiry into the committee's good faith." 0
Prior to Zapata, the decisions of a board of directors, under the
business judgment rule, were given a presumption of good faith, inde-
pendence and reasonableness."' The burden to prove otherwise was on
the shareholder who brought suit. The Zapata court now places on the
board the burden of proving the existence of those elements. As the
court stated, "[t]he corporation should have the burden of proving in-
dependence, good faith and reasonableness.""' 2 The court noted that
"[its] approach [was] consistent with the Delaware approach to 'inter-
ested director' transactions, where -the directors, once the transaction is
attacked, have the burden of establishing its 'intrinsic fairness' to a
court's careful scrutiny."" 3
107. 430 A.2d at 788.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. The court may now question the reasoning for the decision of the board of
directors or its independent committee, not just whether the decision was reached inde-
pendently and in good faith. See 430 A.2d at 789.
111. 430 at A.2d at 782.
112. Id. at 788.
113. Id. at 788-89.
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The second step mandates "[the] trial court [to] determine, apply-
ing its own independent business judgment, whether the motion should
be granted. This means, of course, that instances could arise where a
committee can establish its independence and sound bases for its good
faith decisions and still have the corporation's motion denied." ' 14
' Two commentators, Elmer W. Johnson and Robert S. Osborne,'1 5
felt the decision reached by the lower court in Maldonado I was too
harsh in terms of its impact on "second tier"16 business judgment dis-
missals in cases alleging breach of fiduciary duty."'' 17
Johnson and Osborne suggested a middle ground; once the defen-
dant corporation establishes the independence of its special committee,
"business judgment rule dismissal of derivative claims should be made
available regardless of the nature of the underlying contract.", 8 But
the middle ground they sought was a far distance from the landing
place of Delaware's Supreme Court. The coirt went much further, by
permitting the trial court to actually supplant the committee's business
judgment with its own.
The Johnson and Osborne suggestions seem to accord with the the-
ory that power to manage the corporation, and control its litigation, is
vested in the directors. If the independence and good faith of the com-
mittee's decisions remain in question after review by the trial court, the
court may, appropriately, deny dismissal of the derivative suit.
Allowing the court to delve so deeply into the committee's decision
making process invites judicial overreaching. The court in Zapata ac-
knowledged the danger of such overreaching" - but determined the
trial court's "fresh view" into the matter was desirable to properly bal-
ance the various interests involved.120 The court specifically envisioned
circumstances in which a dismissal, based solely on the corporation's
114. Id. at 789.
115. Johnson & Osborne, supra note 81.
116. The authors refer to the first tier as the original business decision made by
the board which creates the controversy, and the second tier as that decision made by
the committee as to whether or not to sue for injuries resulting from the first decision.
Id. at 64-68.
117. Id. at 68.
118. Id.
119. 430 A.2d at 788.
120. Id.
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ability to show good faith and independence, "would simply prema-
turely terminate a stockholder grievance deserving of further considera-
tion in the corporation's interest. '121
The court's decision in Zapata clearly- limits the use of the busi-
ness judgment rule: the rule is, thus, merely. a shield in demand ex-
cused derivative suits.1 22 The board of directors, or its committee, may,
by motion, seek termination of suit if this accords with its business
judgment. The motion will be honored or denied at the court's
discretion.
Conclusion
There are compelling policy arguments for protecting the minority
shareholder's right to control a derivative suit when controversies arise
regarding a board of director's independence or good faith. Similarly,
there are strong reasons for protecting the rights of the board to direct
corporate litigation. The shareholder, as an owner of the corporation,
seeks to maximize his returns and maintain the prestige, goodwill, and
value of the corporation. The board shares those concerns, but is also
mindful of the need to maintain autonomy as sole decision-maker of
the corporation. Because there are often factors considered in business
decisions which may not directly translate into dollars and cents, the
board of directors should have the flexibility to make those decisions in
good faith. Directors should not have the added pressure of finding the
court in its board room.
The Supreme Court of Delaware, in Zapata, was mindful of the
need to carefully balance the interests of the stockholder and the board
of directors. The "middle ground" the court struck may ultimately
prove to be a fair compromise. However, on its surface the decision in
Zapata creates cause for concern of possible judicial overreaching in
demand excused situations. It is conceivable that.the courts, in follow-
121. Id. at 789.
122. The procedures under "demand required" situations in essence remain un-
changed. The board still has the power to refuse to sue when demand is required. Id. at
785. In fact the court buttressed the sanctity of the board's "business judgment" in
those instances where: 1) demand is required, 2) demand is made, and 3) the board, in
good faith, reaches a decision not to sue. In those situations the court indicated share-
holders will not have standing to sue. Id. at 784.
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ing Zapata, will show little reluctance to carry their own business judg-
ment into demand required situations as well. By attempting to clarify
the various interpretations surrounding application of the business
judgment rule in derivative actions, the Zapata court may have pro-
vided Delaware courts with skeleton keys to all of Delaware's board
rooms.
Kenneth A. Rubin
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